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It is common today, even in the European media, to treat the current crisis of the European Union almost exclusively as an economic
crisis. The present article pretends to show that such a focus is not only wrong but is indeed dangerous for the future development of
the European Union as a whole. The article will argue that the present economic crisis simply aggravated – and a lot – a crisis of
legitimacy through which the European Union has been passing for some time. Showing that the anti-European tendencies which are
spreading throughout the countries of the continent threaten the very future of the European project, the article will make suggestion
on reforms for the future development of the EU, alerting to the necessity to finally elaborate once again a coherent argument for the
continuation of the European integration process which puts the European population at the heart of the political process instead of
just austerity.
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I. Introduction1
There can be little dispute that the European Union is passing through asevere crisis. Even ardent pro-Europeans and EU diplomats admit, orbe it 'off-the-record', that the EU is currently facing extreme difficul-
ties.2 Yet, when one talks about the EU crisis at the moment, the main focus is
still on the economic difficulties which are particularly acute in the Eurozone
and, within that, in a group of countries on the southern periphery of the conti-
nent, such as Greece, Spain, Portugal and Cyprus, Ireland being the geographic
exception.
The argument put forward in this article is that, despite the undoubted se-
verity of the crisis, the current economic difficulties faced by some members
of the European single currency merely add to a much deeper, and much more
political, crisis faced by the European Union as a whole. It will be shown that
the economic difficulties are both partially the result of this deeper political
crisis, and a factor in the deepening of the same, one which, as will be shown,
has the potential to, at least, seriously undermine the prospects for further Eu-
ropean integration in the future and, therefore, the future of the European
Union itself.
In order to confront this crisis, the article will show, the EU, and those who
take decisions within it, will have to move away from their very narrow defini-
tion of the problems they are confronting and begin seeing them as part of a
continuous process which will only be steered into calmer waters again if the
EU takes some tough strategic decisions about where the organization wants to
go and why it actually still exists.
1 I would like to thank the anony-
mous reviewers of the Revista de
Sociologia e Política for their
contributions for this article.
2 As one senior EU diplomat ad-
mitted to the author during an 'on
background' interview.
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After a brief review of the current problems and the 'state of play' in ad-
dressing them, the article will go on to contrast the EU's current approach to its
problems with an approach informed by the concept of adaptive action, deve-
loped by Eoyang and Holladay (2013). Using the three key questions that in-
form adaptive action (What? So what? Now what?), the article will re-
conceptualize the crisis currently confronted by the EU and will make some
specific suggestions as to how it should act and what it should do to get
through its current difficulties.
II. The context: the European Union and the economic crisis
In many ways the economic nature of the crisis confronted by the European
Union seems almost too obvious. One brief look at just some of the indicators
which measure Europe's economic performance shows that, clearly, the conti-
nent and, as such, the European Union, is confronting awesome challenges.
Just to give some examples: between January and March 2013, Greece, per-
haps the worst hit country of all in Europe, notched up its 19th (!) consecutive
quarter of negative growth.3 In Spain, despite a small drop in unemployment in
June 2013, still over a quarter of the workforce are out of a job, with more than
50% of young people not economically active.4 In Ireland, some areas have
seen property prices fall over 50% since 20075 whilst several countries, –
again with Greece as leader amongst them – faced an accumulated public debt
far exceeding national GDP (Finanzkrise: Euro Länder häufen neue Schulden
an, 2013).
Since all of these countries are bound together by the fact that they take
part in a monetary union and share a single currency, this has meant that the
'sovereign debt crisis' (as it has been termed by some, such as Lane (2012)),
turned itself into a severe crisis for the Eurogroup in particular but, as will be
argued, by the European Union as a whole, which was faced by numerous –
and often contradictory – pressures to 'get a grip' on the situation, lest a process
of 'contagion' affected other or all Eurozone countries and EU member states.
On the one hand, the European Union as a whole needed to safeguard its own
single currency and ensure its stability. To do so, it was critical that member
countries did not default on their debt which would have meant their exit from
the single currency with unpredictable consequences both for the currency it-
self and the wider international financial system. It was therefore critical to
ensure the liquidity of both individual countries and the financial system as a
whole. On the other hand, it was seen as necessary to radically reduce the
indebtedness of Eurozone countries. In some cases (Greece and Italy promi-
nent amongst them), policy-makers therefore faced the unenviable task of re-
ducing the indebtedness of the state at a time of a severe economic recession.6
Bearing in mind the above, it is perhaps not surprising that the European
Union chose to define its problems through an economic prism and focus its
anti-crisis policies primarily on economic and fiscal indicators. In order to en-
sure that no Eurozone state default on its debts, the so-called 'Troika' of the
European Union, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) have demanded, in some cases, deep cuts to public spending (and,
as a result, public services) in return for so-called bail-out funds designed to
ensure that states were in a position to meet ongoing financial commitments.
The Economist (No Going Back 2009)was not the only outlet to call the sums
involved 'breathtaking', with the initial Stabilization fund consisting of no less
than 750bn euros. This fund has been followed by the setting-up of a perma-
3 See Trading Economics
(2014a).
4 See Trading Economics
(2014b).
5 See Global Property Guide
(2014).
6 For a timeline of the crisis and
details on the policy actions ta-
ken, see European Central Bank
(2014).
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nent 'stabilization mechanism', as well as the tightening of the rules governing
the single currency and moves to create both some type of economic union as
well as a banking union.7
Without doubt, these actions have had considerable impact and achieved
their overriding initial objective of stopping Eurozone countries going into de-
fault. However, many commentators and analysts doubt whether enough has
been done to resolve the crisis or whether the crisis is in fact over, as proclai-
med by French president Francois Holland recently, with The Economist (Till
default do us part 2013) again leading the charge.
III. Analyzing and evaluating the crisis from an EU perspective
Over the last few years a considerable amount of literature has emerged
analyzing both the origins of - and the EU's response to - the crisis which has
befallen it from an economic perspective, with even American Congress pro-
ducing a detailed study, illustrating the global impact the crisis has had (Nel-
son et al. 2012). Within this literature one can distinguish between two
different aspects of analysis: one essentially asks how the EU got itself into
the situation it is in whilst the other focusses more on whether it has done
enough to get itself out of this situation and what else needs to be done in order
not to confront such a situation again in the future.
Amongst those who have focused on the question of how we got here,
several core arguments can be identified which will be crucial in the later ar-
gument about the political crisis faced by the EU as a whole. From a purely
economic point of view, several specialists have pointed out that the European
Union as a whole never represented a so-called 'optimum currency area'. Ac-
cording to this argument, both the macro-economic circumstances as well as
the economic policies pursued by national governments were simply too diffe-
rent as to be able to form a stable and durable currency union as, for instance,
Bayoumi and Eichgreen (1993) have argued. Following this line of argument,
it can be said that the European Union itself was aware of this problem when it
stipulated the pre-conditions a country had to fulfill before being considered
for membership of the single currency, as well as the rules to be followed
once 'inside the club': these rules, as spelled out in the so-called Stability and
Growth Pact, at first glance, seemed unambiguous, as Nugent (2010) showed.
They committed the members to the pursuit of low inflation and supposedly
put a cap on the amount of public debt a government could accumulate (60%
of GDP) and the annual budget deficits it would be allowed to run (3% of
GDP). The fact that breaches of these rules could be punished and that Euro-
zone monetary policy was also to be overseen by an entirely independent Eu-
ropean Central Bank, the ECB, was also intended to ensure that the Eurozone
would become progressively more coherent internally.
However, there is a general consensus, – and subsequent events would sug-
gest this fact to be obvious, – that these rules were simply not good enough on
the grounds that they were not underpinned by governance mechanisms strong
enough to ensure compliance with the very rules the EU itself established.
Kramer (2012, p. 83) described the governance system of the single currency
as 'fragile', seeing as it was dependent on the agreement and cooperation of the
same member-states it was meant to control. In simple terms, member-states
decided whether to punish member-states for breaching the rules of the single
currency. Wallace, Pollack and Young (2010) make similar arguments.
7 For a more detailed overview of
the measures taken, see Cini and
Borragán (2013).
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Kramer (2012, p. 83) concludes that this fragility was the result of essen-
tially political factors. According to him the two main drivers and architects of
economic and monetary union, former German chancellor Helmut Kohl and
the late French president Francois Mitterand, 'acted as statesmen, not econo-
mists' in setting up monetary union, seeing it as an instrument to anchor a
reunified Germany in the European Union in the aftermath of the Cold War
whilst advancing the cause of European integration.
This interplay between economic and political factors can be seen throug-
hout the history of the single currency. Critically, for instance, the inclusion of
Greece in 2001 was seen as a purely political decision, whilst underlining the
weakness of the enforcement mechanisms, bearing in mind that Greece was in
no position to fulfill the convergence criteria, joining basically by 'cooking the
books' (Böll et al. 2012). Equally significant was the fact that both Germany
and France broke the the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact. Yet, rather
than being punished, the pact was amended to make it more flexible, bowing
to political pressure.All of this led Böll et al. (idem) to entitle their overview of
the origins of the euro 'Operation self-deceit'. Ever since then what has been
lacking is 'a European government which could analyze problems from a Euro-
pean perspective' (Kramer 2012, p. 83).
From that point of view, many saw the crisis of monetary union as inevita-
ble in the absence of an accompanying political union. One senior EU diplo-
mat put it this way: 'I think [the crisis shows that] we have reached the end of
the line as far as what we can do with intergovernmentalism'.8 This is crucial
since it points to the fact that the current crisis of the Eurozone is a result of a
bigger crisis of the European Union, namely the inability of its political lea-
ders to get the 'big things right' because of a lack of political agreement, an
argument forcefully made by Bittner (2010). More will be said on this below.
Another group of analysts have looked at the results of EU policies in the
response to crisis, basically austerity in return for bailout funds. Interestingly,
their conclusions point to the same problems already talked about above.
Generally speaking, the results of the EU's policies have been deeply disap-
pointing. As Blyth (2013, p. 42) has pointed out, despite often deep cuts in
public spending, 'Portugal's debt-to-GDP ratio increased from 62% in 2008 to
108% in 2012. Greece's debt-to-GDP ratio climbed from a 106% in 2007 to
170% in 2012.' Incredible as it might seem, the situation worsened further up
to 2013, with the debt-to-GDP ratio of the Eurozone as a whole reaching 92%,
'4% higher than in 2012' (Finanzkrise: Euro Länder neue Schulden anhäufen
2013). This scenario has led some, like Krugman (2012), to argue that, not
only had the European Union failed to deal with the problems in hand, but it
had actually made a bad situation worse: it had managed, just like several other
political decision-makers around the world, to turn a recession into a depres-
sion, with devastating consequences mainly for the poorest countries and the
poorest segments of the population.
In a further critique, some analysts have argued that, apart from austerity
taking billions of euros out of the economy at precisely the wrong time, the
actions have also left the broader problems that contributed to the crisis unre-
solved. For instance, whilst it may well have been necessary to cut public ex-
penditure in Greece, this will mean very little in the long-term as long as
'structural and fiscal problems remain' (Subacchi & Pickford 2012, p. 3). In
other words, apart from cutting spending, very little has been done to address
the structural root causes that led to the crisis in the first place, both at national
8 Senior EU diplomat, intervie-
wed in June 2013.
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and at European level. Crucially, the EU has been strongly criticized in this
respect for not taking sufficient account of the particular circumstances of
each country, adopting instead a broad-brush macro-level approach to dealing
with the crisis. For instance, it has been argued that only Greece had a real
debt-crisis. In Spain and Ireland, by contrast, there was a housing bubble
whilst Cyprus has recently faced a liquidity crisis in the banking sector. Accor-
ding to this line of argument, made by Krugman (2012) amongst others, each
one of these cases requires a nuanced policy approach. So far, this has not been
forthcoming from the European Union, pointing once again to the political
crisis through which it is passing as a whole.
This begs the question as to why the European Union has not been able to
develop a policy-strategy which would bring the crisis under control and here
one, once again, comes to the political aspects of the entire European project.
The 'modus operandi' of the EU during the crisis was neatly summed up by
Copsey and Haughton (2012, p. 1) when they attested that European leaders
'lurched from one emergency summit to another' in a desperate search for sta-
bility in the Eurozone. Even EU diplomats admit that the spectacle is often
unedifying, but point out that the way the organization operates is the result of
its unique features: 'We need to do many things together but, in the end, the
EU has 27 (now 28) members, all of them sovereign states'.9 In other words,
the very success of the EU (as measured by its continuous expansion) leads to
deep fault-lines in its functioning and, seemingly, diminishing prospects for
future integration even in the face of severe crises like the current one.
This fact, for some, puts the very future of the European Union as it is
currently constituted in doubt. Tsoukalis (2011) pointedly entitled his review
of EU activities in 2010 'the shattering of illusions'. Jo Johnson et al. (2012) at
Chatham House, one of the most respected think tanks for international poli-
tics in Europe, asked if the objective of 'ever closer union' enshrined in the
Maastricht Treaty was still attainable, and, again, Copsey and Haughton
(2012, p. 1) stated bluntly that 'crisis appears to be the new normal state of the
European Union'.
Some have gone further and argued that the European Union has almost
always been in crisis, but that the nature of the crisis makes the current one
more dangerous for the future of the integration process. As Hodson and Pue-
tter (2013, p. 367) have put it: 'Looking back on the history of European inte-
gration, it is difficult to remember a time when the European Union or its
predecessors were not facing a crisis of one sort or another'.
What is different this time, though, is the particular division between 'crisis
states' and 'non-crisis states'. The first group is made up generally of small
states on the southern periphery of the European Union, whilst the latter group
consists, generally, of the rich, northern states. As one keen and long-standing
observer of European affairs noted at a seminar, this particular division is
something new in the history of European integration and has put into question
one of the key principles upon which the process of integration has always
rested since its inception in the 1950s: solidarity. If, according to this observer,
this pillar of mutual solidarity now breaks away, the very future of the integra-
tion project would be in doubt.10
Several commentators have pointed to Germany and its posture as the key
reason for the erosion of solidarity between EU (and in particular, Eurozone)
member states. Mallaby (2012), for example, stated bluntly that Europe's was
9 Interview with EU diplomat,
June 2013.
10 From a seminar held in 2012
and attended by the author.
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an 'optional catastrophe' and that its fate now lay 'in Germany's hands' which
needed to develop strategies for growth instead of merely focusing on austeri-
ty. Such narrow focus, according to Tooze (2012) will lead to stagnation for
Germany in the future.
In view of all these difficulties, some have called for further integration. As
one senior EU official put it: 'We need a political union'.11 Berggruen and
Gardels (2013, p. 134) agree, calling for a concerted effort 'toward a federal
union'. However, others have stated that the current difficulties merely under-
line the folly of embarking on the path towards a single currency in the first
place and warn that any move towards further integration, such as a fiscal
union would merely undermine the future prospects for the organization still
further, creating deep divisions between those inside the Eurozone and those
outside, making coherent political action in response not just to economic dif-
ficulties but to a host of others issues more difficult (Milne 2013).
Following this line of argument, the creation of the single currency and its
deficient execution has led not only to deep divisions between rich northern
and poor southern countries inside the group of single-currency countries but
also between those countries which use the single currency and those outside
it. Again, looking at the recent history of European integration, the fact that
such divisions emerged should not really have come as a surprise. So-called
'opt-outs' that some countries have in some policy areas have become increa-
singly common, one could even say normal, ever since the very Maastricht
Treaty which instigated economic and monetary union as Dinan (2004) has
shown. In many ways, bearing in mind the increasing complexity of the EU,
opt-outs constituted the only way to continue some type of integration, as Wal-
ton and Zilonka (2013) have argued, but this has come at a cost, as the above
discussion shows, in terms of coherence.
The EU, therefore, confronts multiple crises: a deep economic one which
manifests itself most profoundly in some of those countries that use the Euro-
pean single currency, but also a significant political one which affects the enti-
re EU and which needs to be overcome in order to actually effectively deal
with the economic crisis. Failure to do so has accelerated two other crises: a
crisis of legitimacy and a crisis of direction which evolve around the question
what the European Union is actually for. It is these aspects which, as will be
shown now, exist semi-independently from the economic crisis, which make
the current situation so threatening for the future of the EU.
IV. European integration, but for what? The crisis of direction and leadership
There can be little doubt that the failure of the European Union to effecti-
vely deal with the economic crisis has had an adverse effect on the legitimacy
of the organization. According to the EU's own public opinion surveys, only
just over 1 in 5 EU citizens believes that the European Union is capable of
resolving the crisis through its actions (European Commission 2013, p. 3).
Equally worrying, more than half of all EU citizens believe that the worst of
the economic crisis is still to come, an astonishing number bearing in mind the
length of time the crisis has been ongoing (IBID).
Recent surveys have also underscored the EU's north-south divide already
touched upon above, with only 1% of Spaniards and 2% of Cypriots and
Greeks expressing confidence about the state of their country's economy, a
figure which shoots up to 80% and 77% respectively when the same question
11 Interview with EU official,
June 2013.
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is asked of Swedes or Germans (Fox 2013). Critically in terms of the EU's
future prospects, 89% of Cypriots and Greeks contend that their voices are not
being heard inside the European Union (IBID).
The upper echelons of the European Union's political leadership are aware
of these problems. As one EU ambassador put it: 'It is critical to solve the crisis
in order to win back the trust of the population'.12 However, research done by
Serricchio, Tsakatika and Quaglia (2013) has found that euro-skepticism has
many causes, of which the economic crisis is one, but not the most important
one. Whilst the rise in Euro-skepticism is most pronounced in those countries
hardest hit by the economic crisis and whilst there has been a steady increase
in skepticism towards the European Union since the onset of the economic
crisis – nevertheless 'national identity and political institutions play an increa-
singly important role in explaining public euro-skepticism' (idem, 51).
The reference to political institutions is critical in this respect since other
authors have also argued that skepticism towards such institutions is both a
generalized phenomenon and one which pre-dates the economic crisis. As
Wessels (2007) pointed out, there is increasing skepticism towards authorities
and regimes in general. Applied to the European Union, left unchecked, such
tendencies have the potential to significantly undermine support for the gene-
ral project of European integration.
Critically this indicates that the economic crisis 'merely' accelerated a pro-
cess which has been ongoing for some time, suggesting that the EU has some
deep-seeded problems which go way beyond resolving the economic problems
it is currently confronting. For a growing number of commentators the pro-
blems are actually very basic but very fundamental: It is the question of what
the European Union is actually for. In the Chatham House debate (Jo Johnson
et al. 2012), one participant, John Peet, argued that the European Union ur-
gently needed to confront issues of democracy, legitimacy and accountability
brought into sharp focus by the economic crisis (idem, p. 2). Another, John
Jungclaussen, went further saying that the crisis of legitimacy is brought about
by a lack of purpose and direction: 'There is no narrative anymore', as he put it
(idem, p. 3).
Yet, such a narrative has been fundamental in sustaining the European
Union over the decades and instrumental in explaining a large part of its suc-
cess. In fact, as Manners (2008, p. 65) demonstrates, the idea of safeguarding
peace on the European continent was perhaps the overriding narrative through
which the process of economic integration, started with the creation of the
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in the Treaty of Paris, could be
justified and sustained both practically and normatively since 1951. "The suc-
cess of European integration in achieving peace and sustaining this narrative
'changed what passes for normal in world politics' (ibidem).
As Lehmann (2012) has argued, the successful reconciliation between
France and Germany, the stability and economic prosperity in Western Europe
during the Cold War and the generally successful transition of Eastern Europe
from Communism to capitalism and liberal democracy during the 1990s (with
the obvious and terrible exception of the former Yugoslavia) meant that the
EU was able to sustain this narrative over several decades. In fact, in its at-
tempts to raise its foreign policy profile from the 1990s onwards, the EU pur-
sued a clear discourse of serving as a model for integration which could be
reflected and copied around the world. The eventual entry of the vast majority
of the former communist states of Eastern Europe, including in 2004 and 2013
12 Remark made in conversation
with author during a seminar
about the economic crisis.
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respectively the former Yugoslav republics of Slovenia and Croatia, also bears
testament to the enduring popularity of the EU with its immediate neighbors.
The award of the Nobel Peace Price to the European Union in 2012 in
recognition of its achievements in preserving peace represented, in many
ways, the culmination of this process but, as has been argued, also served as a
warning that the future of the organization dependent on it being able to re-
define its purpose and develop a new narrative. The European Union urgently
needs to find an answer to the question being repeatedly asked during demons-
trations in Greece, Spain and elsewhere: 'What can Brussels, and Europe, do
for us' (Jo Johnson et al., p. 3).
Some senior EU figures acknowledge this as a serious problem. One of
them said: 'I think multilateralism is in a big crisis generally [and as such] we
have to admit that our influence outside Brussels is rather limited'.13 The EU
ambassador already cited earlier also admitted these difficulties: 'I agree that
we as an organization are not very good at selling ourselves'.14
To overcome these problems, both argued that 'leadership' was needed.
However, as will be shown now, getting such leadership will be very difficult,
principally because the European Union conceives its own crisis in a way
which makes its solution more difficult.
V. Re-defining the European crisis: What? So what? Now what?
As already shown above, in its definition and management of the crisis the
European Union has focused almost exclusively on the economic aspects of it.
In fact, one can go even further and argue that, for the EU, the crisis revolves
around one key variable: public debt. So, in response to the question what
problem the European Union is facing, it has consistently responded that some
of its member states are facing a fiscal problem which has an impact on one
particular area of integration: its monetary union of which not all of its mem-
ber states are a part. In terms of so what does that mean, as shown above, it has
meant that political action has to focus on changing a couple of key variables,
especially reducing the level of public indebtedness of the most seriously af-
fected countries. This, in turn, would restore the confidence of the financial
markets, thereby encouraging investment and return those countries (and the
Eurozone as a whole) to growth. As such, in response to the question of now
what, the logical answer has been to cut state expenditure in those countries
most seriously affected by the 'debt crisis', 'restructuring' the economies in the
process. Having brought the 'debt problem' 'under control', the aim would then
need to be to create new, more effective rules in order to maintain this situation
as stable as possible for as long as possible and stopping the problems that led
to the crisis from reoccurring. In short, the EU has defined its current crisis in a
limited and classic 'linear' fashion, seeing an unfavorable situation a which,
through the application of specific policies to change a couple of clearly defi-
nable variables, could lead to favorable situation b, which would then need to
be maintained for as long as possible, usually through the 'tightening' of the
rules which govern the particular policy area.
However, as has been shown, this approach has been questioned on two
fundamental points: First, its effectiveness has been called into question on
the grounds that, so far, it has not achieved the desired results. Second, it has
been argued that this approach ignores some of the far deeper problems that
the European Union as a whole faces and which have been exacerbated by the
13 Interview with senior EU offi-
cial, June 2013.
14 Remark made during a seminar
about the economic crisis in
2012.
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economic crisis but were not created by it. As shown, the EU actually faces an
interdependent mix of political and economic problems which, in many ways,
have led to the specific problems now confronted in relation to monetary union
but which, it would seem, the current approach is ill equipped to tackle.
Challenged on this very point by the author, the response of one EU am-
bassador actually gave rise to the idea for the present article. The ambassador
responded: 'I know that we have deeper problems, but first we have to solve
the economic crisis, then we can deal with the other things' (my emphasis).15
In other words, the sequential approach applied to the economic crisis is also
being applied to the political and legitimacy crisis recognized by the EU. Sol-
ving one problem will logically lead to a solution for the other problem.
As will be shown now, however, such an approach does not recognize the
fundamental nature of the problems confronted by the EU and, if continued to
be pursued, will actually worsen those problems. To be able to get hold of its
deeper problems of legitimacy, declining popularity and political stagnation,
the EU will need to stop thinking sequentially and start thinking and acting
adaptively.16 Adaptive action will allow for the construction of a framework
for seeing, understanding and influencing patterns in what is a complex and
changeable crisis situation which extends across several levels of analysis and
which moves forward through the interaction between interdependent and, the-
refore, only semi-autonomous agents across time and space, meaning that one
is confronted with 'continuous action' (Lichtenstein et al. 2006). In practice,
this means very different responses to the questions What? So what? Now
what? as well as a need for constant evaluation and adjustment of policies.
What is essentially trying to uncover the dynamics which underpin, govern
and sustain the current patterns, in our case the crisis of the European Union.
As shown, for the EU itself, these dynamics limit themselves to the fiscal/eco-
nomic crisis of some specific countries. Yet, as outlined above, for many ot-
hers the current fiscal crisis is the result of – and sustains – a much broader
crisis. In fact, as shown, even some senior EU diplomats have recognized the
need for a fundamental reform of the 'EU way' of doing things, arguing for a
political union.
Whilst there are obviously differing opinion about that particular conclu-
sion, there is a broad consensus amongst many observers that, in the words of
Bittner (2010, p. 19) the EU is doing 'small things too big and big things too
small.' In the words of one other observer, 'the EU focusses on small things
because it is no longer able to agree on the strategic issues it faces'.17
In basic terms, the European Union no longer knows what it is for, it no
longer has any clear sense of why it actually exists and, crucially, why it
should exist. In practical terms, there is, clearly, a desire on the part of the EU
and most of its member states to, for instance, save the single currency and
sustain the single market. However, for some countries, such as the UK – this
appears to be an end in itself in order to preserve stability and the advantages
that the single market brings. For those, however, who see them as part of
something bigger, as something normative, it seems increasingly difficult to
make a coherent connection between those projects and the broader strategic
aims of the European Union. As already touched upon above, this problem has
even been recognized by some senior EU officials but has not been addressed
coherently by the organization as a whole. In terms of what do we see when
one looks at the EU today, then, it is an organization which is drifting; in
permanent crisis mode unable to face the future.
15 Remark made at a seminar
about the economic crisis in res-
ponse to a question by the author.
16 For a detailed discussion of
this term and what it means, see
Eoyang and Holladay (2013).
17 Interview with EU analyst,
July 2013.
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This leads one to the second part of the what question: What has led to –
and caused – the emergence of the current pattern? In practical terms, as was
already discussed earlier, it seems clear that the set-up of the institutional and
political arrangements of monetary union, its governance structures, were ina-
dequate to deal with the complexities inherent in a currency union between
very different sovereign states. However, this underlines the fact that the way
the European Union 'does things', as a general rule, has also been inadequate.
As shown above, Greece's participation in monetary union, for instance, was
an almost entirely political, as opposed to an economic, decision. It was seen
as politically more convenient to have Greece inside rather than outside 'the
club'. As such, one of the factors which led to the current pattern of crisis was
a lack of political will to take hard decisions, a lack, if one likes, of political
resilience in the face of tough political choices, coming back to the problem of
lack of leadership already touched upon above. In fact, it could be argued that
the unwillingness or unpreparedness to take big and hard decisions (such as
leaving a willing member state out of the currency union, for example) are
signs of a lack of confidence and/or conviction in the strength of one's own
project. The EU has become an organization where 'muddling through' is a
way of avoiding hard decisions rather than the result of pursing a clear strate-
gic objective within a complex environment, a small but critical difference.
In many ways it could be argued that this lack of political resilience is the
result of the extraordinary success of the EU over the decades both in political
and economic terms and, therefore, the lack of urgency in constantly re-asking
the why question. Politically, it is now inconceivable that any major European
countries would go to war with one another. For European leaders from Mon-
net and Schuman to Mitterand and Kohl, this was the key point of European
integration. For today's generation of leaders it is normal. Economically, too,
Europeans, at least, had come to view prosperity, low inflation etc. as normal.
In fact, in some countries one could even make a direct link between EU mem-
bership and economic prosperity, such as in Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Gree-
ce, coincidentally some of the same countries that are now suffering the worst
economic crises. In the case of Ireland, for instance, Barnes (2009) has pointed
out that 'the economic performance since the mid-1990s had been remarkable:
GDP per capita growth averaged close to 5% from 1995 to 2007'. Finally, the
long-standing success of the EU also entrenched an institutional pattern of lea-
dership by elites. For decades, the European Union essentially relied on passi-
ve legitimacy, that is, acceptance by the population of decisions taken by
'Brussels' as Dinan (2004), amongst others, has shown. This worked for as
long as things were going well but - and here the specific economic crisis has
had a significant magnifying impact - is now being openly challenged by some
which, as shown, has put considerable strain on the assumptions upon which
European integration has always been based, such as solidarity. Schmitter
(2012) even argued that all these issues pointed the way towards European
disintegration. Within this context, there has also been a renewed debate about
the supposed 'democratic deficit' at the heart of the European Union, as Suther-
land (2012) has shown.
A lot more could be said on all of these issues.However, even this very
cursory look shows that, far from being an economic crisis, asking what the
current patterns of European integration are and represent shows that there
have been significant changes to these patterns and, I would argue, an erosion
of many of them. In basic terms, the 'European condition' of peace and prospe-
rity in the Post-War period was seen as permanent and, almost, automatic. As
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such, the basis for European integration was not questioned or challenged or
significantly renewed.
Yet, clearly, perspectives on European integration have changed, just as the
circumstances within which the process takes place, have changed. What has
not been done is to adapt the European Union strategically to these changes.T-
his brings us to the second question: So what (does it mean)?
In very basic terms, and following on from the paragraph above, the Euro-
pean Union, apart from facing a particular economic crisis, is also confronting
a considerable strategic vacuum. Its propensity to think sequentially means
that it has no answer to one critical question the author once put to one national
ambassador of an EU member state: why solve the crisis? The answer given
was revealing. The ambassador talked about the need to work jointly between
member states to boost employment, to sharpen up the rules of the single cur-
rency, to bring public finances under control and about the need to save the
single currency because the consequences of it failing would be unknowable
but potentially catastrophic for the European Union.18
Yet, these are all particular answers for the particular economic problems.
They reveal fear rather than a positive vision, enhancing the negative feedback
which the EU has been receiving and generating. If there is no common vision,
something which holds the block together, why not let Greece leave the euro in
order to allow it to devalue its currency to get the economy going again? Why
not, consequently, let other countries that so whish leave the euro, giving them
the freedom to set their own interest rates?
Doing such things, obviously, has considerable risks simply because it has
not been tried before. Whilst there are (weak) rules for governing the entry of
countries into the euro and their behavior once inside the single currency, few
to no provisions were made for governing the exit of a country from the single
currency, as Böll et al. (2012) have shown. It would, therefore, be a journey
into the unknown.
However, in the absence of a vision – some kind of idea about where the
EU wants to go and why it is worth preserving and persisting with – the va-
cuum is filled by euro-skeptic voices pointing to the obvious problems large
parts of the population are experiencing, pinning blame on the EU and her
policies and offering simplistic but, on the face of it, attractive solutions to the
crisis. One can see such patterns in Greece, in Italy and, in general terms, a
steady rise of euro-skeptic parties across large parts of the European Union
who are using the economic crisis to advance long-held broader arguments
against the EU. Crucially, though, as Taggart and Szczerbiak (2013) have
shown, this process began before the onset of the current economic crisis,
pointing, once again, to the deeper roots of the current EU malaise.
So, what the European Union is confronting is a problem which the va-
cuum at the heart of its own thinking is reinforcing and perpetuating: the ero-
sion of the common ground which has held the organization and its member
states together over the decades. Instead, what are coming steadily to the fore
are the differences that co-exist within the EU: between member states, bet-
ween member states and EU institutions, between the different EU institutions,
between different actors within these particular institutions etc. Over the deca-
des, these differences have always existed and have indeed been necessary to
allow for the EU to advance and adapt, as Geyer (2003) has shown, yet these
differences always existed within the context of a clear aim, a clear and shared
18 Debate with an EU member-
state ambassador during a semi-
nar in 2012.
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purpose about what European integration was about and what it was for, as
shown above. This is currently absent because crisis-management is the per-
manent state of the European Union.
So what does that mean in practical terms?
The consequence of this is that, progressively, individual actors, member
state governments, political parties, the media and citizens – have taken to
filling the strategic void left by the EU, with the result that there seems to be
now a self-reinforcing process of erosion of patterns that also seemed a 'given'
and which have historically underpinned the core polices of the European
Union. This is particularly clear in relation to the single market and its guaran-
tee of freedom of movement of people, as Pascouau (2012) has pointed out.
For instance, Denmark has taken measures to re-introduce border controls in
certain cases, undermining the freedom of movement of European citizens.
The UK government is pushing for a re-negotiation of its membership terms
and has also identified freedom of movement as a key area of concern, some-
thing that even actors within the institutional structure of the EU are now ac-
cepting as legitimate. As already mentioned, in several countries, anti-EU
parties now receive considerable numbers of votes, with the potential to influ-
ence government policy. Responding to this, several governments, including
of traditionally pro-European countries such as the Netherlands, have started
'audits' of what the European Union does, arguing for a radical re-orientation
of its activities, normally meaning doing less, leaving more to member states
to determine individually. In fact, a summary of the Dutch government's re-
commendations done by EUobserver (2013) came to a full 20 pages.
This is not to say that an audit of EU activities would necessarily be a bad
thing. For instance, what Cameron (2013) essentially argued was that the EU,
to make itself relevant again in the world and in relation to its own citizens,
should focus on its core activities, which he defined as the Eurozone's gover-
nance structures, European competitiveness, the single market and, as such,
'the gap between the EU and its citizens'. Cameron therefore made a specific
connection between the Eurozone crisis and the crisis of the EU, which he
defined both in practical (economic) terms and in terms of legitimacy, precise-
ly some of the arguments put forward in this article. Crucially, however, he is
using these problems to argue for a scaling-back of European integration. Tho-
se not in favor of such a refocusing of EU activities therefore need to engage
with such an argument and develop a positive counter-argument. This has, so
far, not occurred though it is to be hoped that audits and speeches such as
Cameron's will at least kick-start a debate around such questions.
In short, the European Union is confronting a progressively unfavorable
landscape on which to re-establish its legitimacy and, therefore, its political
influence. In order to do so, however, it will need to adapt its approach and,
crucially, its objectives.
Now what (can we do)?
Everything that has been said so far leads to one firm conclusion: the EU
has to radically re-define of the crisis it is facing. This crisis will not end if and
when the Eurozone crisis 'ends' and the economic situation stabilizes since it is
only one part of a much broader picture. The EU, therefore, has to stop thin-
king in narrow, economic terms and it has to stop thinking sequentially. The
reason it will not be able to first solve the economic crisis and then the political
one is because, as I hope to have shown, both interact with – and sustain one
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another in complex and interdependent ways. As such, they are both part of the
same general pattern that currently underpins the European Union.
The objective of European Union action has to be to change this general
pattern through specific interventions. To do so in a way which enhances rat-
her than undermines the coherence of its integration process it has to re-think
its approach to change. As shown above, the EU is currently operating in a
classic top-down way. It tells those countries in the most severe economic
difficulties what they have to do in order to receive support. It has also defined
an 'ideal' state towards which it wants to take these countries in terms of debt-
reduction and public sector reform. This has, as we have seen, led to signifi-
cant public resistance and a further erosion of the general consensus which has
sustained the EU over the years, underlining again the interdependent nature
between the Eurozone and the EU crisis. The result is that the EU is trying to
solve a short-term crisis without having defined clear long-term goals.
As a first step, therefore, the EU has to take the lead in a broad debate
about its long-term objective. As shown, several countries are individually be-
ginning a process of re-defining what they want European integration to be. It
is critical that the EU takes a key role in these debates and begins to shape
them. It has to act rather than react. Bearing in mind the complex nature of the
EU structure, this in itself will not be a smooth process (nor should it be) but
the organization needs to have a debate about what it wants to be.
Doing so will allow the European Union to do another key thing: de-cen-
tralize. As shown above, even within the confines of the economic crisis, 'eve-
ry case is a case', that is to say, each case has its own particularities which
depend critically on particular local circumstances. It is, therefore, critical that
local actors be allowed to respond to the local boundary conditions they en-
counter.
This approach is equally valid for the broader question of the future of the
EU. As shown above, the EU often currently takes decisions on micro-matters
largely because it is unable to agree on the important strategic matters. As one
Italian observer of EU affairs once put it to the author: 'Why does the EU have
to regulate hunting in Italy'19 It tries (but fails) to be a micromanager rather
than being a strategic leader which, in turn, undermines public support for it
by being seen to 'interfere' in essentially national issues, a key issue which also
informed the Dutch 'audit' already referred to above.
Within a broadly defined strategic objective, the EU then can, and should,
encourage the emergence of different approaches and policies across time and
space in pursuit of this clearly defined broad strategic objective. Some authors,
such as Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) call this a process of 'creative destruc-
tion' but in many ways it simply means the encouragement of experimentation
and learning: what works where, when, how and why?
This leads to a third key issue: de-centralization and adaptation are critical
simply because the outcome of any given policy-process is unknowable. The-
refore, learning is a critical pre-requisite for correcting possible mistakes or
possible unintended outcomes or consequences. As such, both the policies in
respect of the economic crisis and the debates about the future of the European
Union as a whole are not moving towards a pre-determined end-point. What is
needed is continuous adjustment of an ongoing process. The EU therefore has
to continuously ask questions about how this process is progressing. It should
not pretend to have all the answers. 'How can we improve the current pattern
19 Remarks made to the author
during a seminar in 2012.
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of integration at European level' is an infinitely more productive way of enga-
ging the various interested stakeholders than saying 'you have to follow us to
this point because only this option will work', as has been done in relation to
Greece, for example.
Now what can we do, as a question, therefore, refers much more to the type
of process that is being used in order to address particular problems than co-
ming up with definitive answers. Since the EU is a highly complex social sys-
tem which evolves through the interaction of interdependent (and hence semi-
autonomous) agents across time and space and several levels of analysis, it is
an illusion to think that the exact outcome of any given policy process and/or
process of implementation can be controlled. There is too much uncertainty.
As such, the EU has to adopt a posture of continuous inquiry, embedded within
a clear context of strategic objectives without which there would be no purpose
to the inquiry.
VI . Conclusions
The aim of this text has been to show that the crisis the EU is currently
facing is far broader than the immediate economic crisis of the Eurozone and
some of its member states in particular. It has been argued that the organiza-
tion is also facing a strategic crisis in the sense that it does not know where it is
going or what it wants to be. Critically, in the absence of such strategic objec-
tives, it is much, much harder to solve the immediate crisis since there is no
clear sense as to why that crisis should be solved within the context of the
European Union. The strategic crisis of the EU and the particular crisis of the
Eurozone are, therefore, intimately linked and sustain one another.
It has also been shown that, in the absence of a strategic objective and a
clear sense of why the European Union exists, public support for – and the
foundations of – the process of European integration erode. This process has
been accelerated – but not started – by the current economic crisis.
In order to begin to address these problems this work has presented the
concept of adaptive action and applied it to the EU and its current situation.
Asking the question what, so what and now what, it has been shown that the
European Union needs to think of its development as an ongoing process of
questioning, learning and adjusting in order to change the patterns that under-
pin the process of integration. Asking such questions and standing in perma-
nent inquiry would allow the EU to act as a strategic leader rather than the
overloaded micromanager it is trying to be at the moment. The aim needs to
be to make the EU politically more resilient than it has proven to be so far.
The question of how to create a politically more resilient EU will require a
lot more work and research. Ways will have to be found to make the instituti-
onal framework more flexible in the face of severe crises and more alert to the
warning signs of a coming crisis, i.e. signs that point to an erosion of the exis-
ting patterns sustaining integration. To do so, it may well be necessary to do an
'audit' of EU activities of the type that several national governments are cur-
rently conducting. However, it is essential that the EU lead such a debate rat-
her than follow it and that, again, such an audit be guided by some clear
principles. As has been argued, such principles should include a commitment
to de-centralization, as well as a focus on the 'big' issues which can and will
make a positive difference to people's lives rather than the current obsession
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with regulating lots of small issues that can perfectly well be dealt with at
national or even local level.
All of this may and should eventually lead to dealing with the biggest issue
of all: why should the European Union still exist in the 21st century? It seems a
simple question, but a clear answer is needed as a matter of urgency.
Kai Lehmann (klehmann@usp.br) é PhD em Relações Internacionais pela Universidade de Liverpool (Reino Unido) e pro-
fessor do Instituto de Relações Internacionais da Universidade de São Paulo (USP).
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RESUMO
É comum, mesmo na imprensa europeia, tratar a atual crise da União Europeia exclusivamente como uma crise econômica. O
presente artigo pretende mostrar que esse foco não está somente errado mas perigoso para o desenvolvimento futuro da organização
em si. O artigo sustentará que a crise econômica simplesmente agravou – e muito – uma crise de legitimidade pela qual a União
Europeia está passando há algum tempo. Mostrando que as tendências antieuropeias que estão se espalhando pelos países europeus
ameaçam o futuro do projeto de integração europeia, o artigo fará sugestões para reformas na atuação da União Europeia e alerta
pela necessidade de finalmente elaborar mais uma vez um argumento coerente para justificar a continuação do projeto europeu,
colocando a população europeia no coração do processo político europeu em vez de somente se aplicarem medidas de austeridade.
A pesquisa foi um estudo qualitativo, baseada numa revisão da literatura existente sobre a crise e entrevistas com especialistas e
políticos da União Europeia. O artigo estabeleceu que a União Europeia está passando por múltiplos crises, tanto no nível político,
quanto no nível econômico, de uma forma interdependente. O artigo também mostra que existe um reconhecimento dessa crise por
parte de alguns oficiais da União Europeia mas também uma incapacidade de agir, por dificuldades políticas, assim como um
entendimento errado da natureza da crise sendo enfrentada. A originalidade do artigo se dá pela definição da crise da União Euro-
peia como uma crise política E econômica que interagem em um processo contínuo. O artigo mostra que se trata de um processo de
"ação adaptativa", baseada nas perguntas "what", "so what", "now what?" Essas perguntas têm implicações importantes para as ações
da União Europeia em resposta à crise atual, que o artigo aborda. Sendo assim, o artigo propôs uma visão diferente e original sobre o
que representa a crise atual e o que tem que ser feita em resposta a ela.
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: União Europeia; crises múltiplas; ação adaptativa; austeridade; integração Europeia.
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